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ABSTRACT  
 
This paper discusses fisheries management reforms through involving local level 
institutions (LLFI). It is based on studies which were undertaken on Tanzania’s Lake 
Victoria fishery where LLFIs were established through the formation of Local 
enforcement Units, later named Beach Management Units (BMU), between 1998 
and 2002.  The paper takes the view that the overfishing problems that confront 
Tanzania’s fisheries management authorities are best understood from a social 
science perspective.  The argument is that most communities’ values and institutions 
are embedded in their societies.  The same is however, not true for externally 
originated management tools and systems as is the case with BMUs.  This paper 
shows that the BMUs established between 1998 and 2002, were not sufficiently 
grounded in their socio-cultural environment and this led them to be unsustainable 
and ineffective.  The paper demonstrates that this mismatch by examining the 
different historical and social contexts in which livelihoods such as fishing emerged 
and was carried out.  These social contexts generated social values that explain the 
individual behaviour of community members.  It is such values that communities 
always strive to maintain in any activity including fishing.  Thus, when confronted 
with situations that threaten these values, communities strategize or negotiate ways 
to cope. The coping strategies of two communities riparian to the lake are discussed. 
The paper therefore proposes a framework for making these units ‘fit’ local 
conditions in order to make them effective and sustainable so as to reform fisheries 
management. 
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In their quest to address the problem of overfishing world wide (Pauly et al. 1998), 
social scientists have argued strongly for the inclusion of fishers in the management 
process (c.f. Kooiman et al 2005; Wilson et al. 2003).  Social scientists view fishers 
as social beings whose behaviour is embedded within a set of socio-cultural values, 
norms and knowledge defined by the community in which they belong and where 
they attain their identities, beliefs and actions (Granovetter 1985; Kurien 2001).  
These values define their power structures and guide their actions as they relate to 
natural resources such as fish.  Capturing these values by involving the fishers in the 
management of their own resource leads them to take more responsibility for 
sustainable fisheries exploitation. Central to the participation of fishers in fisheries 
management is the issue of institutions
1.  It is through institutions that behaviour is 
defined and order is achieved.  
 
One strategy of trying to address the issue of social forces in management structures 
has been the development of co-managerial strategies.  That means incorporating 
the ‘civil society’ (Jentoft and McCay 2003) in fisheries management.  But it is not 
just a matter of bringing the civil society into the management process per se, but a 
proper design of such participation is required to enable effective community-based 
                                                 
1 In this paper, institutions are defined as regularized pattern of behaviour that emerges from underlying 
structures   3
fisheries management.  The design has, among other things, to deal with issues of 
legitimacy (Jentoft, 1999) and property rights. Share out of management 
responsibilities among stakeholders is essential here which requires an 
understanding of institutions operating within the stakeholder community.  These 
include institutional histories and social context (Jentoft and Mikalsen 2003).  This is 
to say that institutions operate within a particular socio-cultural context. Whether they 
are created or built on old ones, institutions must correspond with their local 
environment.  The argument is that institutions if they are made to operate within a 
given social and cultural context, they will work well.  Fisheries cooperatives are 
given as an example of such institutions that have often been unable to adjust to the 
institutional forms at the community level (Jentoft 1986).   
 
This paper discusses the formulation of a co-management regime in the Lake 
Victoria fishing (Tanzania) communities.  The paper examines the set up of the 
regime which occurred during the period 1998 – 2002 by forming Beach 
Management Units (BMU). These BMUs are here referred to as local level fisheries 
institution (LLFI).  The premise is that the principles of co-management are not 
necessarily new to local communities but have been operative as of the local 
institutional fabric.  However, co-management was set up with very minimal 
recognition of the institutional forms that exist at the community level and this led to 
their poor performance that warranted their reformation.  The challenge for 
advocates of co-management therefore is to design it in a way that its structure is 
sensitive to the local cultures.   
 
The paper begins by a theoretical perspective of understanding communities.  This is 
then followed by a discussion on community values and how these values were 
studied. A discussion on how these values originated and are used in community 
activities is then presented, this is then discussed in the light of the established 
BMUs, we discuss the pitfalls of the BMU regime based on the use of the community 
values.  We finally draw a conclusion and lessons for co-management. 
 
EMBEDDED INSTITUTIONS: SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
The notion of embeddedness (Polanyi, 1957 Granovetter, 1992) is used here to 
understand the local social set-up.  Embeddedness has been presented as the 
contextualization of economic activity in on-going patterns of social relations 
(Granovetter  1985).  This notion seeks to show that economic exchange is 
embedded in and defined by complex social processes. Thus, from this perspective 
economic behaviour such as fishing is embedded in wider social relations.  In fact 
Coser and Rosenberg (1957) argued that the maximization of favourable attitudes 
from others would thus be the counterpart in sociological theory to the maximization 
of profit in economic theory.  When relating to others or the environment, individuals 
will not act to safeguard their individual interests but to safeguard their social 
standing, claims and assets, which the individual acquires through his/her 
membership of a community or group. It is this group or community that defines his 
or her social standing, claims and assets.  The community or group has designed a 
behaviour pattern and so by living in the community or group the individual acquires 
the pattern or way of doing things of the community and this is internalized 
(Durkheim 1974) and becomes an individual’s behaviour.  So, the way an individual   4
actually behaves and what others see in his/her behaviour is in essence the 
community in him/her (Ibid).   
 
More generally Berger and Luckmann (1972: 72)., when discussing the origins of 
institutions, argue the same with regard to institutions: “Institutions …by the very fact 
of their existence control human conduct by setting up predefined patterns of 
conduct, which channel it in one direction as against the many other directions that 
would theoretically be possible.”   
 
This argument does not negate or oppose the idea of an individual being responsible 
for what he/she does, in fact what happens is that as an individual socializes in the 
community or group to which he/she belongs, the individual becomes conscious of 
the ‘me’ in him/her through expressions and appraisals of his/her community or 
group members (Mead 1934).  He/she is motivated to achieve a positive image of 
him/herself by winning the acceptance and status of the group or community.  
 
People are profoundly sensitive to the expectations of others so all actions are 
inevitably guided by these expectations (Coser and Rosenberg 1957).  It is further 
argued that this is a constant component of personality (Ibid).  For this reason, an 
individual will internalize behaviour patterns that make his/her group or community 
appraise him/her favourably.  But he/she can also choose to internalize behaviour 
that causes him/her to be appraised negatively and in this case the community or 
group will exercise negative sanctions such as blame and punishment.  In this case, 
an individual is considered un-socialized, and or a deviant.  For fisheries this means 
that the individual becomes a fisher from primary groups -in this case the ethnic 
community.  Fishing activities practiced are a reflection of what the community has 
defined for fishers.  The type of fishing gear, seasons, areas and types are a 
reflection of the community to which an individual belongs.  When out fishing he/she 
is in another group, the ‘fisher’s group’, in this group he/she acquires the 
characteristics and behaviour that depict the fishers group.   
 
This means that the behaviour of fishers is based on internalized values and norms 
of their community that guides them on how to respond to various situations.  To 
individual community members who are exposed to a proto-realistic world in which 
they can afford the luxury of at least a modicum doubt (Berger and Luckmann 1972), 
the demands of community behaviour are of a higher priority than any other 
demands on behaviour (for instance fisheries authorities behaviour demands). 
Therefore fisheries regulations will in essence be complied with in as far as they do 
not interfere with the “voice” of the community.  Compliance to government fisheries 
laws and regulations is based on how a community perceives them to be legitimate 
(Gezelius 2004).  In addition to this, the community will view participation in a co-
management regime as a means of perpetuating the way a community does things 
rather than introducing new patterns.  As a consequence, if the fisheries regulations 
imposed from the outside are contrary to the way a community do things, the 
community will try to diffuse it by designing a method of presenting their efficiency in 
executing the government fisheries regulations to the fisheries authorities in a 
manner that the latter wants to hear while in reality the opposite is true. 
 
Thus, in order to understand how LLFI’s work as management institutions, it is 
important to understand the traditional and cultural environment in which they   5
operate.  Local communities have different histories on what their existence 
depends.  The manipulation of the natural resources and systems to provide for such 
needs generated varied meanings and the value communities place on them.  Such 
meanings and values have been reflected in the way communities have interacted 
with the environment, with each other and with others external to their community.  
Communities have enacted rules and regulations through which they have interacted 
with the environment (Bromley, 1991). Bromley argues that these rules present 
property rights regimes and include rights and rules.  These rules and regulations 
are nested within a larger unit (Hanna and Jentoft, 1996, Kurien, 2001).  Individual 
behaviour, also those of communities, is therefore well understood from a larger unit 




In order to understand the values of these communities, a study was undertaken in 
2003 to 2004.  The fishing communities studied were the Wakerewe and Kakseru.  
The Wakiseru and Wakerewe are Bantu speaking communities.  The Wakerewe 
currently live in the Ukerewe Island
2 on the lake whereas the Wakiseru presently live 
on the eastern side.  Qualitative methods were used to study these communities. 
The specific study tools used included: Observation, In-depth interview, Historical 
analysis, Kinesics, Focus group discussion, Semi-structured interviews, Venn 
diagrams, Wealth ranking.  Data was generated in two phases.  The first phase 
involved gathering as much information as possible on the social set up of the 
selected communities, patterns of behaviour and the meanings of such behaviour.  
During this phase, information was generated in understanding traditional institutions 
and how they operate within the cultural milieux of these communities. The second 
phase involved generating information on the current LLFI’s.  This involved 
interviews with the members of the communities, leaders of the LLFI’s as well as 
other members of the communities, especially opinion leaders. 
 
The history of these communities reveals that there was a value placed on land and 
cultural and social relations.  The value of land led the members of these 
communities to migrate from several places to where they are presently settled.   
Land was very important because it was mainly used for agriculture to produce food 
and for settlement.  Cattle were yet another capital which became valuable 
especially for the Wakiseru during their migration.  One possible reason could be 
that as they migrated they met the Nilots who were pastoralists and in order to create 
harmony with them, cattle played an important role as giveaway resource in 
exchange for ending hostility and violence.  Cattle were also used for marriage 
between them and the Nilots.  Just like land, cattle were very valuable because it 
guaranteed that there was food from its meat, milk for children, and blood for the 
youth and skin for clothing for the adults. 
 
On cultural and social
3 values, community members adopted distinctive experiences 
while they migrated and mingled with people from other communities and these 
experiences gave them a unique status or reputation.  Such experiences created 
                                                 
2 This is the biggest Island on the lake. It is actually administratively a district. 
3 In this paper social values referred to have the same meaning as social capital coined by Lin (2001) and 
Putman (1993, 2000) and cultural values as cultural capital as used by Bourdieu (1993 and 1984).     6
values which have been deeply rooted in the community or clan institutions.  Their 
life’s perspective tended to be channelled into a limited number of alternative 
patterns.   
 
Each alternative was embedded in local institutions which channel behaviour into 
predictable alternatives.  Some consistence of the value choices can thus be 
detected by observing institutionalized practices.  For instance each of these 
communities is a location of several social institutions and hierarchies.  Each 
institutional setting of importance has a tendency to create a cultural totality with 
distinctive aims and values and each cultural and social sphere has its own capital
4 
(Seppällä 1998).  Such values would for instance include holiness for a religious 
hierarchy which is acquired through a command of memory and interpretation of 
verses from the Bible or Koran and an appropriate behaviour.  The social capitals 
are those that are vested in social relations and enable people to correlate.  Such 
capitals include trust and respect which are expected to be reciprocal in social 
relations.  It is this level of values that have created a socio-cultural environment 
through which community members live and all institutions (economic and natural) 
rooted. In this paper we concentrate on this level of values. 
 
The two communities therefore present themselves as relatively stable locations 
where continuous interaction moulds members in similar direction.  Thus members of 
the community are not directly seen or categorized as a homogeneous mass but this 
is the impression one gets with individual members exhibiting shared norms, values 
and behaviour.  Within the Wakerewe and the Wakiseru, what comes out is a 
complex value system based on a mixture of their past diffused with values brought 
by colonialists.  This value complex is further influenced by the values of the present 
brought by the state and the global community within the realm of sustainable 
development.   
 
In the following we locate seven of these values from the past namely co-operation, 
respect, wisdom, traditional authority, order, continuity of lineage/kinship and trust.  
The values brought by the colonialists state and global community include education, 
competition and religion.  The coming of the colonialists gave a new meaning to the 
past values and is slowly changing the values placed in them.  These values are 
briefly discussed below.   
 
Co-operation 
Holding of this value implied agreeing to work together with the others. This was 
evident in marriages, families, and agricultural practices and in fishing.  It was 
considered a moral value where everybody was expected to exercise without being 
forced into.  In fact it was desirable because as these communities and clans 
migrated and settled in a place, they realized that holding on to one another was 
necessary especially during deaths, wars and farming.  These are also some of the 
ways in which co-operation has been maintained to date.  This value was also seen 
to provide direct benefits to community members for instance in agriculture; - the 
weeding and harvesting together ensured that each family in the clan got food when 
it was ready.  Co-operation during the fishing trip ensure that members of the group 
came home alive and happy.  During arrival from fishing trip, the welcome offered to 
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those who went fishing was an indication of a joyous community or clan to receive 
back their sons. 
 
Traditional authority 
This was universally recognized as a value base.  It was exercised by elders who 
possessed knowledge of history on the community, wisdom (busara), age, elders 
coming from the chiefs clan, family heads (mostly considered to be men), the chief 
and clan leaders.  Historically, influence by individuals with this value was limited by 
the scope of belonging to the community. It demanded respect and the holders were 
expected to exhibit behaviour of a role model in the community where the young 
members of the community could learn how to exercise all other values.   
 
It was a desirable value to hold.  It was also a required value to enable one to be 
appointed, selected or elected to position of leadership. This value has been 
maintained through behaviour where young people consult those possessing this 
value on a variety of issues such as marriage (including counselling), land, family 
relations, and community conflict resolution mechanism and even by those aspiring 
to be politicians consulting to receive approval.    
 
A new meaning has been given to this value, for instance in Ukerewe where the 
District Commissioner is considered to hold this value, community members can 
listen to him.  Any member of the community who exercises calmness, self respect 
and a champion of community interests is also seen to hold it.  Elders are still highly 
seen to hold it regardless of whether they exercise the above-mentioned factors.  
Within the Wakiseru, generosity, which was an important factor for being recognized 
as leader in their clan, plays an important factor for one to be considered to hold this 
value.  A generous person is considered to be one who is able to feed, give free help 
to people and is hospitable.  
 
Respect 
This was a state of being regarded with high honour or esteem.  In the traditional set 
up, to posses this value one had to be able to relate to others in a way that did not 
create anger, animosity, hatred and disunity in the society.  It is a value that had no 
boundary of age, group, sex or clan in possessing it.   
 
There was however a difference among various clans.  Within the Wakerewe, 
individuals who came from the chief’s clan enjoyed a higher level of respect than 
individuals from other clans.   For instance an individual from the former clan was 
received with full attention if he visited any family within the clan.  Activities that were 
being undertaken on that day in the family would temporarily come to a standstill as 
they pay attention to the visitor.  He could be offered a chair to sit and fed extremely 
well, entertained and seen off honourably.  But an individual from a clan other than 
the chief’s would be welcomed when he visits, offered a chair to sit.  Other activities 
would continue as usual, he would be fed if he found those he visited eating.  But to 
both communities, all members of the family had a right to be respected regardless 
of one’s possession of other values.  This was a value that to a great extent 
controlled people’s behaviour, it was highly cherished and nobody wished to be 
termed disrespectful.  It was a value that if one lacked, then he/she would be 
negatively sanctioned through blame, punishment and at times end up in a perpetual 
curse.  Behaviour expected to show respect was exercised differently to different   8
categories of groups, for instance behaviour to elders, youth and strangers was 
clearly distinct.  One could joke, play or argue with peers but not elders. 
 
Wisdom 
Considered as calmness, clear mindedness, being able to give good advice and 
exercising self-restraint.  This is slightly different from other types of values because 
it does not form its own type of hierarchies.  In the traditional society it was a 
privilege for the elders and the aged family heads regardless of their possession of 
other values.  But slowly it degenerated to only being a privilege for a certain group 
of people such as the wealthy or men only.   
 
The wealthy were a source of help to many people and the fact that they could 
understand their needs and offer the needed help showed that they possessed it. It 
could be shown to all people, even the poor who were carefully listened to when they 
expressed their opinion.  In other words, wisdom was and is still being considered as 
having knowledge of the past and being able to use it to confront the present 
challenges and make good judgments and decisions.  Today knowledge is not only 
considered a preserve of the old but also to those who go to school who are able to 
use the school knowledge to confront today’s problems.  Nevertheless, a difference 
still exists between the school knowledge and the old knowledge.  The former is 
considered not to be deeply rooted in the latter but only to an external authority.  
Those who possess school knowledge and are able to integrate it with the latter 
have been considered to be wiser. 
 
Order 
This is a value which is twofold.  Order exists both at the individual and community or 
clan level.  At the individual level, it was considered as the ability to avoid violence 
and cherish peace, and harmony and being able to reach agreement with others.  At 
the community level, it was considered as a state in which community regularized 
pattern of behaviour that was a moral obligation for all members.  In fact it was the 
value in which all other values were directed to, it was like the ultimate goal of the 
community or clan.   
 
Being able to keep a promise as in marriage, exhibiting behaviour as is required of 
one and carrying out activities as has been the practice of the community or clan 
were all considered as being in possession of this value.  But with time, interests 
have not remained static, there have been different interest groups emerging due to 
in and out migration to these communities in the wake of globalization and 
nationalization.  Thus this value is now perceived to be the ability to hold to your 
group interest and remain united with other groups holding different interests. 
 
Continuity of lineage/kinship 
This was and still remains a very important but silent value.  It simply meant ability to 
reproduce.  Women were disadvantaged because they were easily exposed in case 
one did not have this ability because it was easy to note they were not able to 
conceive and give birth.  Men on the other hand although they suffered from this 
inability, they were always covered by having another man with this ability to father 
children with his wife in his name, this was made very secret.    
   9
This value is still held with high esteem and it is seen during funerals when an old 
man or woman dies all his/her offspring would be counted and publicly announced 
with pride during the funeral.  This is taken as a consolation that although he/she is 
gone, he/she has left a ‘big’ community to carry his name forward.  In addition to this 
there is also extreme joy when a woman gives birth; this has escalated to even births 
outside wedlock involving schoolgirls which was considered as a disgrace during 
those days.  Although in principle birth outside wedlock is not encouraged, when it 
occurs it is never condemned but received very positively.  Some young men who 
are intending to marry would prefer to marry a girl he knows will bear children and 
the only way they confirm this is whether the girl has a baby or not. 
 
Education  
This is a new value brought by the colonialists.  In the traditional society, it was 
considered in terms of knowledge acquired through having lived for a long time and 
gone through different experiences.  Such experiences included clan or community 
migrations, conflicts with other communities, negotiations during marriage periods 
and identification and decision making on best areas to feed animals, fish and hunt.  
But now it is acquired through going to school and receiving a certificate which is 
believed to show that you possess it.   
 
In Ukerewe, this value was not a major influence except when the holder uses it in 
the village context.  In fact many of those who posses this value and come from the 
island are not residing here, some have moved out completely and others only come 
for short visits.  The group which is visible are the teachers in several schools, both 
primary, secondary and one teacher training college, some of these teachers are 
actually from outside the district and they have been posted here by the government.  
They do not have any significant leadership in the community.   
 
There are also other government officers working at the Village level such as the 
Village Executive Officers and Ward Executive Officers.  Their responsibilities are 
vital but salaries are so meagre that they face the same livelihood conditions as the 
rest in the community.  At the District level however, there are more educated people 
some with university degrees and others with college certificates.   
 
This is also true within the Wakiseru but the difference here is that, possessing this 
value yields some extra status; elders who are opinion leaders in the community lend 
a listening ear when a holder of this value speaks.  However, when such a person 
uses this value in a way not to support local prevailing ideas, then the locals isolate 
him and gossip is used as a social control mechanism to alienate him.  Gossip is 
silently prominent in these communities such that it can be considered as an 
important value to marshal support for activities. 
 
Trust 
This was a value assumed to be possessed by all members of the community.  It 
was considered to be the ability to have complete confidence in and believe in the 
honesty and reliability of other community members.  This value was assumed to be 
cultivated through interactions within the community.  It was so crucial that one could 
consider it as the basic value that held the community together.  It is this value that 
has kept the Wakerewe unique and cohesive to date.  The idea of keeping secrets   10
and factors considered in being elected to BMU membership by the local community 
are good examples of holding this value.   
 
Within the Wakiseru, this value was compromised for other values such as land 
when they decided to give their daughters for marriage. They could never keep their 
secrets such as war weapons, traditional charms to overpower opponents among 
others to themselves.  This was because their daughters would reveal them to their 
husbands where they got married.  Within the community this has further been 
compromised by school education which advocates academic objectivity, openness 
and honesty.  In Ukerewe those with education have found it very difficult to 
compromise their new way of life and have responded by keeping away from the 
community and only paying short visits.  
 
Competition  
This can be considered as a completely new value introduced by the colonialists and 
global community.  In fact it can be traced as far back as the time of the Arab traders 
who used ivory to win the support of the chiefs.  It is a value in which the holder 
expresses by acting in a way to outdo another, or take advantage of the inability of 
the other person to get something more than him.   
 
It is evident in the society by people building better houses than others, having more 
certificates than others, and having a control of more people and more land.  It has 
created divisions of people in the community.  This value is considered as an 
impediment to social cohesion but is it highly cherished.  It is a value which is 
considered as useful in an economic sense but it is disembedding the society. 
 
Religion 
Religion is not very recent to these communities although in their history the concept 
existed totally in a different form, for instance Kalungu who was a fishing god was 
only useful during fishing time.  Going to him happened only during times of need 
and not a regularized weekly or daily practice.  The coming of colonialists gave a 
new meaning to this value, holiness which is interpreted as being able to memorize 
verses in the Bible or Koran and an accompanying appropriate behaviour was an 
evidence of possessing this value.   
 
There are two religions within these communities, Islam and Christianity.  Christianity 
is the dominating religion whereas Islam comprises of a small minority. The Christian 
churches have relaxed their rules to accommodate even those considered to be 
Biblically not appropriate to qualify as full members.  For instance the churches 
except preach against polygamy but accept polygamists to attend their services.  In 
both communities this value can be easily used to acquire other values such as 
political authority.  
 
 
Based on these factors, when individuals met for discussion or activity, one ensured 
that these values were upheld.  This was so crucial when talking or doing anything.  
To these communities, it is not only the activity being talked about that was 
perceived to be important but to ensure that these values were not diluted and that 
the activity being undertaken was not given opportunity to erode these values.  This   11
required that all behaviour towards each other should reflect possession of these 
values.   
 
Social relations were considered to be important above all other things.  This is why 
the youth had to carry an elders’ luggage when the latter came across the former, 
the decision of the Chief Mkuru had to be complied with at all times in the 
community.  Possession of natural value such as land and being able to control a big 
labour force was of no consequence if one did not uphold the community values.  
Each one therefore strived to show behaviour that ensured he/she maintained 
his/her social standing in the community.  Fishing, hunting and agriculture were all 
penetrated and customized by social relations, which dictated any outcomes from 
them. 
 
THE MAKING OF INSTITUTIONS  
 
The values discussed above created a perception on what these communities 
considered to be morally right and on this basis rules were formulated reflecting their 
subjectivity (cognitive) on the rules.   Thus the morals of these communities were 
founded on their social relations.  To these communities harmony, unity and peace 
were the primary goals for social relations and constituted what was moral.  Thus 
when rules were formulated, they considered whether such rules would promote 
harmony, peace and unity, or in other words social cohesion.  
 
Elders, who were in most cases the rule makers, would observe during various 
occasions what activities and behaviour promoted social cohesion and when they 
identified one, they would approve of it and promote it in all possible ways to be 
regularized as the way of doing things.  In this way institutions were created.  In 
fishing, the gears used were not necessarily designed with the purpose of 
dependence on fish as the only way to live, but what could be seen from the use of 
such gears was that the community could get food, fish together and maintain the 
morals (harmony, peace and unity).   
 
The rules which were enacted such as avoiding sex by both partners during the 
fishing period, sharing responsibilities while out fishing were all a reflection on 
upholding the community’s values other focusing on the fish.  One may argue that 
this was so because getting fish was not a problem and fish trade had not become 
so important.   
 
However this cannot be true when for instance the Wakerewe took two full moons to 
be out fishing.  Moreover interpersonal relations and networks have been found to be 
more important in trade than just prices and costs (Westerdahl 2001).  Thus all 
institutions had a history and a reason for it.  In most cases the history was linked to 
an occasion or event that the community went through.  During this period, there was 
only one way of perceiving things, the elders’ way. 
 
Institutions were created based on a socio-cultural environment in which the society 
sought to be socially cohesive.  But to maintain this cohesiveness, the various 
cultural practices which gave birth to these institutions had to proceed, these were 
the marriages, the family, the festivities such burial practices and harvest among 
others.     12
 
However, when outsiders such as the Arabs and colonialists came, a different 
environment was created.  Local communities were compelled by the fear of the gun 
to succumb to the whims of the colonialists and as a consequence lost their freedom 
to practice their life the way they had created it.  This loss of freedom was fought 
vigorously.  This fight extended to these communities and had great impact on them.   
 
To these communities, freedom meant that they could not continue enjoying the 
harmony, peace and unity that they had already created and so they had to fight to 
regain it.  This fight enabled the late Mwalimu Julias Nyerere
5 to rally all ethnic 
communities in Tanganyika to fight.  This rallying also implied dismantling the 
individual community strength and forming a bigger unit comprising all.  But they also 
realized that in order to fight the white colonialists, they had to acquire literacy 
(reading and writing).  Initially the colonialists had used literacy as a way to win the 
support of the locals, but now it was a useful tool in the fight for freedom.  Through 
this, education was introduced and the value of knowledge to account for wisdom 
given a new meaning. 
 
The fight for independence gave a new meaning to the values discussed above.   
Their new meanings did not differ so much from their original meaning except that if 
put on a scale, they were applied to a larger group beyond the clan or community 
level.  The different communities in Tanganyika became a community where these 
values were exercised.  But given that they were being used to fight for 
independence, the gaining of the independence in 1961 did not allow for the 
independence of the ethnic communities but for the whole country and so the 
communities remained under one big community.   
 
Nyerere tried to suppress the local communities by trying to copy what was a 
practice in these communities especially on authority structure.  He created villages 
under the Ujamaa socialism system.  The head of the village was to assume the role 
of the chief (Mkuru), and he was to govern by a council of elders elected by the 
village members.  Thus the culture which was already prevailing on the authority of 
the elders did not die but given a new meaning. 
 
The transfer was made easy because a social cultural environment was already 
created based on these values.  These communities still sought harmony, unity and 
peace not only among themselves but also with all others in the whole country.  And 
because they coincidentally found that they shared these values it became much 
easier to adjust to one another.  But there were factors affecting the values as 
institutions were being transferred, these were globalization and nationalization 
processes.   
 
The industrialization and the accompanying technology, the fast changing 
information technology, and bureaucracy all brought in a new society which is the 
bureaucratic society.  This society had to be introduced in the traditional society.  As 
the two societies co-existed, a completely new society has emerged.  A society 
which is here referred to as Tradi-rocratic society.  This word is coined from 
traditional (Tradi) and Bureaucratic (-rocratic) making Tradi-rocratic.  The meaning of 
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it is that this is a society in which the local people have accepted bureaucratic 
authority brought by the globalization.  But at the same time traditional society has 
not been done a way with.  It is within this Tradi-rocratic society that the two 
communities studied were found to be living.  But local individuals still hold on to 
what their community demands from them. 
 
Existence of Tradiro-cratic society is crucial for the survival of the local communities.  
Local people have been relegated to either being crew members in fishing camps 
owned by people who have connections with the Fish Processing Plants or by those 
who are able to invest heavily in the industry.  Because these locals cannot invest to 
this level, they have to find a means of surviving and one such way is to become 
crewmembers.  This implies that they have lost control of the fisheries resource as it 
used to be.  Therefore their clinging to the Traditional society guarantees that they 
can continue to trust and co-operate with their fellow community members to gain 
access to the fish although through illegal means.   
 
To them they believe that they have free access to the fish but they are being driven 
out by the technological changes which they cannot cope up with both in the 
catching and marketing sectors.  They also accept that the traditional fishing 
organization in which they confined themselves to either traditional gears or beaches 
or fishing periods as no longer valid.  They however, do not have any alternative 
through which they can improve their traditional practice except to cling to the 
traditional values.  Their traditional leaders remain very useful and important but they 
have been ignored when the Fisheries Division introduces new institutions.  This has 
left them to negotiate silently with these new institutions. 
  
THE PITFALLS OF BEACH MANAGEMENT UNIT 
 
In  1998, the FD organized one-day meetings with local fishers living in selected 
beaches in the Mwanza Gulf of Lake Victoria.  These meetings sought to involve 
local fishers in fisheries management.  Several Local Enforcement Units (LEUs) 
were formed in the gulf as a result of these meetings.  The LEU format reflected the 
FD perception of what and how co-management should operate in Tanzania.   
 
The successful establishment of these LEU’s in the Mwanza gulf encouraged the FD 
to establish them in the whole Tanzanian part of the lake.  The LEUs were later 
renamed Beach Management Units (BMU).  In 2000 the FD formed 57 of these units 
in Ukerewe island and 32 in Tarime districts among other districts. The BMU regime 
was formulated and implemented under such an unclear understanding of the 
operations of the Tradi-rocratic society.   
 
The formulators assumed that having been working with these communities as a 
government gave them an automatic knowledge on how to implement a co-
management regime with the variations it has acquired.  The concept of legitimacy 
and compliance was understood from the angle of enacting laws in parliament and 
enforcing them.  This was a complete contrast to what legitimacy and compliance 
was in the traditional society.  In this traditional society, anything approved by elders 
and regularized, as ‘our way of doing things’ was considered legitimate.   
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Although parliament could be considered as the ultimate ‘elders’, its members are 
seen to be town dwellers who are detached from the reality of community conditions 
or have taken a different position once they have been elected.  It is therefore here 
that the mismatch originates and the BMU regime ended up being an external model 
brought without much considerations of the local institutional fabric.  That is to say, 
the BMUs were brought in on an understanding of a bureaucratic society principles 
developed and defined by a western culture of democracy, empowerment, legitimacy 
and equality.  These principles have different meanings, understanding and value in 
a different culture like the Wakerewe and Wakiseru.   
 
The BMU regime as established exhibited the following drawbacks: 
 
The BMU are established with an emphasis on economic capital 
In its interpretation, the Tanzania Fisheries Policy seeks to maximize income from 
the sale of fish, maximize foreign currency earning, maximize employment and 
maximize food supply.  These to a great extent are emphasising economic capital.  
The major reason for this emphasis is the Nile perch fisheries which have earned the 
country a substantial amount of money (URT 1999, Kulindwa 2001) and so the FD 
wishes to sustain this income.  This therefore means that the policy must address 
those issues which will not jeopardize it.  When increases in the use of illegal fishing 
gears were noted, community participation was thought to be a good way to address 
this.  These illegal gears were a threat to the incomes which were being generated.  
Thus by introducing the BMUs the whole idea was simply to improve conditions 
necessary for the earnings from the fishery.  This has left out the community 
institutional fabric. 
  
Conflict resolution mechanisms followed the court system which has a 
number of weaknesses as opposed to local resolution of conflict which could 
be more effective 
The fisheries of the lake face a number of conflicts (Medard and Okeyo-Owuor 
2002), among them are conflicts between gillnet owners and long liners in the lake.  
Normally the gillnet fishers allows their nets to drift (Tembea) and while drifting, they 
collect long- lines along their way, this causes a lot of problems between them.   
Those who can afford the Tembea fishery are the ones who have connections to the 
FPP.  When such conflicts are taken to the courts they take a long time and in 
addition Tembea fishers manoeuvre their ways to win the case and even come out 
unrepentant.   
 
Whereas this paper does not question the functions of the court system, it is 
however appropriate to point out that it is faced with a lot of challenges in its efforts 
to administer justice and it is a place that some people go to for winning rather than 
to reconcile.  A reform is needed for this system.  But an inherent problem which will 
have to be dealt with is that so long as there are multiple sources of authorities in the 
BMU regime where the BMUs, Village Government, District Government and the 
Fisheries Division are involved, conflict will always arise.  It is therefore necessary to 
think of other means that can compliment the court system.  One possible way could 
be the traditional authority which has been quicker in conflict resolution 
(Viswanathan 2003). 
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The structure of the BMU fails to assign specific duties to individual BMU 
members.   
Each BMU was formed with a membership of twenty members.  This was further 
subdivided into an executive committee (5 members) and other members who could 
be called when there is some work or visitors to attend to.  Among the other 
members themselves, there was no specific responsibility assigned to each one and 
so no one could be held individually responsible when things were observed to be 
going wrong.   
 
BMUs are an extension of the FD 
The FD still has the authority to make all decisions and the BMUs are there to 
enforce the decisions made by the FD.  This therefore makes them an extension of 
the FD.  In fact a demand for payment has been made by members of these units for 
them to work effectively.  The FD also started these groups on a wrong foot by 
issuing them with items that in principle were part of what they used to see Fisheries 
staff at the beaches use when they are on patrol.  It therefore appeared from the 
start that they were going to be such an extension. 
 
BMUs hijacked by Fish Processing Plants once given the mandate by law 
When BMUs were formed in 2000, there was no clear Act that recognized them as 
being part of the Monitoring and Control and Surveillance (MCS) system of the FD.  
The latter therefore started preparing such an Act, and it was likely to be taken to 
Parliament in late 2003.  Such an Act would empower BMUs to undertake the MCS 
with the full authority of the law. Once the process of the law is complete, it has been 
even said that the BMUs will assume the responsibility of inspecting vehicles 
collecting fish from the beaches to the Plants to ensure that some level of quality is 
achieved.   
 
These vehicles are owned by FPP’s and have been loaned to Agents, some of 
whom have fishing camps.  While efforts to legalise BMUs is going on, the catching 
sector is slowly drifting into the hands of the Fish Processing Sector through 
advancing loans in form or gears, boats and engines.  But the operators of the 
vehicles are actually the owners of the fishing camps employing local fishermen.  
Given their influence over the local fishermen, they will change the BMUs by either 
becoming members or sponsoring their candidates for elections to become members 
and thereby take control of the BMUs.  Through this way the FPP that are in the 
hands of foreigners (Abila and Jansen 1997) will eventually be controlling this sector. 
 
Potential of BMUs curtailing access rights to the resource by the local 
fisheries 
Since late 1990s a new privatization process was introduced in Tanzania where 
even beaches were tendered to those who are able to collect taxes for the Local 
Authorities (local district governments).  What happens in this process is that local 
government authorities have authority to design ways and means through which they 
can generate incomes from their local district resources for their operations.  
 
This authority has led to the identification of several sources among them is 
fisheries.  Incomes include taxes levied on traders who use local markets to sell their 
goods, fishers who use beaches to land their fish.  In this system, beaches have 
been very lucrative because they have attracted so many business people.  In most   16
beaches, there are several businesses going on.  The Local Authorities therefore 
thought that these beaches could give them good money and so they started to 
privatize them.   
 
Individuals and even BMUs were free to tender for them.  Each beach has a price 
tag per month.  When one wins the tender, what the local authority requires is that 
one pays the Local Authority the monthly price.  How one gets this amount is by 
one’s own design.  This has seen those who have won such tenders charge literally 
everyone who does anything at the beach. A few local fishers who have gears and 
use loaned boats have been charged the same as the big fishing camps.  But as 
these fishing camps are also growing bigger and bigger there is a potential that they 
will soon declare beaches their territories where if one wants to use then one has to 
belong to the camp or pay dearly.  In this way local fishers loose access rights.  In 
addition to this, if BMUs get into the hands of the fishing camp owners and they 
implement the regulations as required, then access rights will be greatly curtailed.  
 
At BMU formation, inadequate time was spent in socially preparing the local 
committees 
One of the greatest outcries on the BMUs by those who were concerned about their 
effectiveness was the short time spent on their formation.  As pointed out in chapter 
five, a one-day meeting with local communities was thought to be enough according 
to the FD.  There were no proper preparations as to what implementing this regime 
should comprise besides just going straight in forming them at the beaches.  The 
idea of pre-implementation, implementation and post implementation process 
proposed by Pomeroy and Harkes (2000) never found any consideration.  This 
therefore led to incorporating people who were less socially ready for such a task.  
The result of it has been poor performance.  
 
The push of this regime is one sided 
The FD first thought up the whole idea of the BMU system.  They sat and planned for 
what should be done in order to have it established.  They sought for funds and 
mobilized themselves to talk to the fishers.  Once it was established, FD personnel 
have been leading the process.  One notable thing has been the fact that this move 
is one sided.  The fishers themselves have not come up to make their input felt, they 
have fallen to the move already created by the FD.   
 
They wait until the FD instructs them on what to do.  In fact during this study it was 
reported that one of the BMUs visited in Ukerewe had just been called to participate 
in an MCS organized by the FD in the Island.  The one sided push on this regime 
creates a question on their support by the other side and therefore their 
sustainability.  Could it be that the fishers are not in support of them despite having 
agreed to form the BMU?   Could it be that these units did not address the fishers’ 
expectations and therefore fishers’ developed less interest in them?  These are 
some few questions among many others that should be of concern. 
 
Unclear structure and unequal distribution of incentives  
When these units were formed, there was unclear definition of incentives to the 
members.  Later on they were asked to come up with byelaws, which could help 
them in introducing fines on certain petty offences such as taking a bath in the lake.  
Incomes generated from fines initially seemed welcome but in actuality it became   17
very difficult to implement such regulations let alone people caught being able to pay 
the fines.  Thus generating incomes through fines presented a great challenge.  In 
response to this challenge, the FD started campaigning for these units to get tenders 
to collect taxes at the beaches, the campaign still continues.  While the campaign 
continues, the incentive structure still remains unclear. 
 
 BMUs are socio-culturally insensitive  
As already argued, the institutions which were created for fisheries had a social 
relations bearing, but the BMUs are directed more towards economic and natural 
resources.  Based on this bearing, the local communities whose life is based on 
social relations had to negotiate their way on how to make these BMUs address their 
morals.   
 
This is why they accept their formation but they choose members to these units who 
will promote community cultural values.  This points to the fact that socio-cultural 
sensitive institutions have a high performance probability and can lead to successful 
natural resources management.  This is where the fisheries management reform 
should zero in.  The reasons for this are numerous, such institutions are useful in: 
facilitating flow of information among the communities; exert influence on those who 
make critical decisions in the fisheries; certifying an individual’s social credentials by 
creating social networks and relations to enable community members to access the 
fish; and finally, they are able to reinforce identity and recognition. That is to say that 
they have not been able to recognize one’s worthiness as an individual and a 
member of these communities sharing of resources, which is crucial in providing 
emotional support and public acknowledgement to claim the resources (Lin 2001). 
 
A miscalculated entry point to the communities. 
At formation, the FD planned for the establishment of these BMUs and then asked 
the District Fisheries Officers of Local District Governments to identify people who 
could be called for a meeting to discuss issues already prepared by the FD.  In other 
words the FD entry point was through the District Councils (here referred to as 
organization entry point).  Other options such as village elders, opinion leaders, 
churches and Non-governmental Organizations could have been explored.  This 
organization entry point only sent a message of government authority to the local 
communities.   
 
While they filtered how this would affect their lives, disapproval was already in the 
offing when they demanded working equipment, a physical office to operate from 
and an incentive package.  However one other option could have been to enter 
through community activities or festivities (here referred to as local Institution entry 
point).  Here they could have used fishers to identify problems of the fisheries and 
ask them to suggest on solutions.  Such an entry point has been useful and very 
successful in Babati Forest management in Tanzania (Alden-Wily 2001)  
 
 
With these drawbacks, the only outcome for the BMUs is poor performance.  In fact 
an evaluation of these units three to four years later found out that less than half 
were actually performing as expected (Onyango, Medard and Mahatane, 2002; 
Abila, Odongkara and Onyango-in press). In a similar manner some studies using 
the argument have also raised similar concerns.  Westerdahl (2001) in his study on   18
Jämtland and twenty European co-operatives discovered that small organizations 
with local roots were becoming more prominent at a time when values such as size, 
capital returns and global presence were dominant.  
 
The pitfalls do not imply that models or regimes which are implemented with 
consideration of socio-cultural conditions will not experience any challenges.  The 
challenges will be there but at a different scale and type.  Nevertheless studies 
elsewhere reveal that in most cases such models or regimes are successful.  A few 
successful examples include Japanese human resources development. Robinson 
(2003) documents that American firms have been forced to adapt themselves to the 
Japanese recruitment process which is so firmly embedded in Japanese social 
structure and norms.  Powerful American firms have had no success in bringing 
about change to this job market and they are only forced to conform.  Those that 
have conformed have had good success.   
 
Westerdahl (2001) quoting Ylva Hasselberg Swedish article Den Sociala ekonomin 
of 1998 where the latter writes about the Swedish Ironworks notes that ironworks 
survived the 19th century threats to the iron manufacturers of international 
competition and insufficient cost controls.  This survival was because the owner of 
the Furudal used social capital especially his extensive network of contacts he had 
developed over time to increase value to the products.  Therefore, BMUs would 
probably have experienced success if they had adopted the socio-cultural conditions 
of the local communities.  
 
DISCUSSION:  LESSONS FOR CO-MANAGEMENT 
 
To make BMUs fit local socio-cultural environment, there is a need to work towards a 
combination of embeddedness and autonomy of social ties both at the fishing 
community and government levels.  At the fishing community level, embeddedness 
translates into integration implying bonds that are upheld within a certain community.  
Autonomy translates into linkage; that is up keeping of bonds with non-community 
members.  At the government level, embeddedness translates into synergy meaning 
official representatives are connected to other actors in society such as FPP (State – 
Civil society linkage).   
 
State-civil society relations need to be clear and dynamic for BMUs to make any 
economic impact.  Autonomy translates into integrity meaning that government 
representatives and civil servants are governed by a professional ethos committing 
them to negotiate and pursue collective goals as opposed to narrow group interests.  
 
For the design of co-management this implies: 
 
•   The concept co-management focuses on building relationships among 
stakeholders. Sharing responsibilities which is key issue in co-management is 
more inclined to building social relations. It is therefore important that co-
managers understand this perception and build a regime that promotes it. 
•   A co-management regime requires a pro-target group perspective.  Co-
management regimes normally target fishers who are faced with difficult 
challenges ranging from poverty to livelihood related issues such as social 
services and welfare.  Such challenges require socially oriented policies. It is   19
therefore important that co-management regimes be established on pro-target 
group concerns.  In addition to this, co-management must encompass 
empowerment and improve the voice of the target group.  If the voice of the 
group is not heard then they will unlikely not comply with what is decided.  
•   Co-management requires a socio-cultural fit.  For co-management to be 
successful, it needs to be part of the fabric of community and way of doing 
things in the lives of individual community members. Towards this end, 
fisheries authorities should direct their efforts to understanding socio-cultural 
aspects of communities such as Tradiro-cratic society and how co-
management can fit in it. 
•   Co-management should bridge the gap between traditional and bureaucratic 
systems.  The dilemma that faces co-management is that it has to be 
implemented in such a way that it empowers the local fishers and not the 
power elites who already have a domineering character in the fisheries.  But 
at the same time, these power elites must not be left out otherwise they will 
fight co-management and not allow it to operate.   
•   Co-management should not be perceived as an entirely new regime.  The 
problem with co-management has been on implementation.  The way it has 
been implemented has made it look like a new regime which is being 
introduced to these communities and therefore needing new techniques.  This 
perception is erroneous and may only lead to unsuccessful implementation.  
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